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FOREIGN COMPANIES RAISING CAPITAL IN
THE UNITED STATES
Michael H. Coles
1. INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS
MR. HAWES: We have been talking about banking. In the
fashion of Americans, we separate banking from securities; this is
unlike the fashion in Europe where there are universal banks. Wie
will first examine the raising of capital in the U.S. by companies
from abroad and then we will discuss the raising of capital abroad
by U.S. companies. Thus, we hope to get a clearer picture of the
internationalization of the securities markets, particularly the
primary markets. Turning next to an analysis of the law on invest-
ment by foreigners, we will use as illustrations the law of Japan,
the law of Europe (if one may call it that), and the law of the U.S.
We will be looking to see whether perhaps there is a need for great-
er coordination or harmonization of the law on foreign investments
in the major countries.
Harmonization is already taking place, to a greater or lesser
degree, in accounting and in disclosure rules. We will be examin-
ing those subjects as a possible precedent for harmonization and
cooperation in other areas. We then take a look at the extent to
which the natural forces in the market, especially the trading mar-
kets, have pressed beyond national borders without a concomitant
extension of regulatory supervision. We will be looking at the bar-
riers to international activity by brokers and, to some extent banks,
which have been raised by national interests. First Michael Coles
will speak on foreign companies raising capital in the U.S.
MR. COLES: I have been asked to talk about the use of the
U.S. capital markets by foreign issuers. Much of the market that
I will duscuss is often referred to as the Yankee bond market.
This is customarily defined as the U.S. domestic market for debt
obligations, either non-convertible or convertible into equity, of
non-U.S. issuers, which obligations have been registered with the
SEC under the Securities Act of 1933. The Yankee bond market does
not generally include debt issued here by Canadian issuers, and I
will adhere to this convention. However, in addressing myself to
the Yankee bond market, I do not wish in any way to neglect the
small but growing market here for pure foreign equity issues.
2. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Development of the Yankee Bond Market
The Yankee bond market is often erroneously considered to be
a recent phenomenon. However, if we go back into history we will
find that, contrary to its position prior to World War I when the
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U.S. was a substantial debtor country and its growth was financed
in large part by European capital, the U.S. found itself in the
1920s as the world's largest creditor nation, being owed significant
amounts of money by most of the combatants involved in World War I.
As a result, the U.S. became, and with some exceptions and in dif-
ferent degree has continued to be, an important supplier of capital
to the rest of the world.
Much of the debt offered in this market during the 1920s and
early 1930s lapsed into default during World War II; and much of it
still remains subject to settlement plans whereby investors will re-
ceive only a small proportion of their original outlay. Most hold-
ers, for example, would probably prefer to forget the 1922 Bolivia
Eight Percents, due 1947, or the Republic of Cuba four and one-half
percent bonds due 1977, issued in 1937. The First Bohemian Glass-
works located in Czechoslovakia must have been considered a good
investment in 1927 when it issued its seven percent bonds due 1957.
Purchasers of the City of Warsaw seven percent bonds issued in 1928
and due 30 years later could hardly have foreseen the destruction
of that city in the early days of World War II, and the subsequent
subjugation of Poland by the Soviets.
Most of the early Yankee bonds I have mentioned, and many
others, are traded at nominal prices on the various stock exchanges.
Probably they have greater value in the eyes of investors as the
bases of lampshades or colorful bathroom wallpaper. One of the major
points I wish to make today is to stress the significant differences
between the market for foreign bonds in the U.S. now, compared to
the market that existed prior to World War II. Later I will discuss
what I perceive to be the much greater safety offered investors in
today's Yankee bonds as opposed to their unfortunate predecessors.
Obviously, during most of the Depression and during World War
II there was very little activity for foreign bond issuers in the
New York market. However, the U.S. came out of World War II as a
major creditor nation again, and during the period from 1945 until
1963 the Yankee bond market was the most important non-bank source
of U.S. dollar borrowings for foreign issuers. Sales of foreign
bonds to U.S. residents reached close to $1 billion in 1962 and
during 1963 were running at a rate almost double that amount.
As a result of rising concern about the increasing outflow of
capital, the Kennedy Administration introduced in 1963 an interest
equalization tax, designed to make it unattractive for most issuers
to use the Yankee bond market. In addition, so-called voluntary
guidelines severely limited the portfolio investments of U.S. non-
bank financial institutions in the securities of foreign issuers.
In 1974 the controls on U.S. investments abroad were removed.
Since that time eighty-six straight debt issues aggregating $10.3
billion for twenty-nine non-U.S. borrowers, eight convertible bond
.ssues totalling $475 million for six non-U.S. corporations, and
fourteen equity issues totalling $565 million for eleven non-U.S.
issuers have been successfully offered in this market.
The theme of this conference is the internationalization of
the capital markets. The Yankee bond market now represents a quite
significant portion of a global capital market which, over the last
ten years, has demonstrated a considerable ability not only to fi-
nance the growing and continuing capital needs of the industrialized
world but also to take care of the tremendous burden of capital
flows resulting from OPEC surpluses and the corresponding deficits
on the part of oil importing countries.
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B. The Current Yankee Bond Market
Let us take a look at the Yankee bond market: first, the
market for straight or non-convertible bonds. In 1974, after the
interest equalization tax was removed, the market was opened by one
issue on the part of the European Investment Bank, which raised $100
million in this market. There followed seventeen issues in 1975,
and twenty-eight in 1976; the volume peaked at twenty-nine in 1977.
The volume since that time has tended to decline; only eight issues
were offered in 1980.
There are a number of reasons for this apparent decline but
the most logical explanation is the increasing depth and liquidity
in the Eurobond market, both primary and secondary, which has enabled
issuers to raise money there in large amounts and on terms which
compare favorably with those available in New York. A further rea-
son--which I will discuss more fully later on--is the fact that bond
markets worldwide have become increasingly volatile and speed is
essential if an issuer is to obtain the best possible conditions in
the market. Whereas a Eurobond issue can be completed by a sovereign
or supranational issuer in a matter of hours, the registration re-
quirements of the SEC, until recently in any event, made the process
of raising money in the U.S. market considerably slower. Dollar
amounts have reflected the number of issues. In 1977, the peak year,
there were $2.3 billion of issues made here by foreigners; the amount
in 1980 was less than half of that.
It is not altogether surprising that the Yankee bond market
has been dominated by sovereign and supranational borrowers. The
number of private sector corporations who have been prepared to un-
dergo the rigors of registration with the SEC is relatively small.
In the straight debt sector, European supranational organizations--
in other words, the European Economic Community itself, the European
Coal and Steel Community, the European Investment Bank, and Eurofima
--have accounted for thirty-three issues or just under one-third of
the total amount offered, with a total dollar amount of $3.4 billion.
European countries have accounted for forty-three issues, with
France being the single most frequent borrower with fourteen issues
and Norway having the largest volume with total offerings of $1.25
billion. Other issuers have been Austria, Finland, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. Non-European governments have accounted for twenty-
seven issues, with Australia--having done eleven with just under $1
billion--being far and away the most important. Others include
Japan, Brazil, Mexico, New Zealand, and Venezuela.
Many of these governments have chosen to borrow indirectly
through a state agency guaranteed by the government; others have
borrowed in their own names. The credit distinction by investors
between these two routes appears to be minimal. Some municipalities
have come here, the City of Oslo and the City of Stockholm account-
ing for three issues between them.
In the straight debt private sector, on the other hand, only
three issuers have appeared to date: ICI for two issues, British
Petroleum and Ito Yokado, a Japanese retailer, one each.
Let us look now at the equity sector of the market which is,
of course, confined to corporate issuers. Since 1974 there have been
nine issues of convertible bonds made in this market by foreigners--
all of the issuers being located in Japan. The total amount issued
was $535 million, and all the issues were made for maturities of
fifteen years. There have also been eleven issues of pure equity
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securities, all in the form of American Depository Receipts. Nine of
these were for Japanese companies, two for British companies.
C. Changes and Improvements
Why should American investors, given the somewhat disastrous
record of foreign borrowers in this market between World War I and
World War II, be willing to buy foreign securities in substantial
amounts today? I think there are a number of reasons why investors
look upon the Yankee bond market today as being dramatically dif-
ferent from that which existed prior to World War II.
First we must remember that most of the issues prior to World
War II took place before 1933 and were therefore not subject to the
disclosure requirements of the 1933 Securities Act. We should not
underestimate the importance of the clean nature of our securities
markets. If you are going to invest in securities, you might as well
choose a game where the deck is not stacked and the players keep
their hands above the table.
Second, the world financial community has changed dramatical-
ly since World War II. There is a strong network of interrelating
financial connections. Countries that qualify for entry into the
U.S. market are among the world's leading industrial nations, and
they are normally substantial borrowers in a number of different mar-
kets. It is arguable that if one of the major borrowers here--such
as France, Norway or Japan--were by any remote possibility to run
into problems in servicing its foreign debt, it would undertake
emergency loans from the World Bank or the IMF, activate existing
inter-governmental swap agreements, run down reserves, tighten belts,
cut back imports, or even hold rescheduling discussions with its
commercial bank creditors. A whole host of measures would be tried
before acknowledging the severity of the crisis by incurring any
kind of default in externally funded debt. Continual access to in-
ternational credit is a country's life blood. To permit curtail-
ment of this access because of an impaired record of debt service
would be a national disaster. Corporate issuers are generally based
in countries that are themselves well-accepted borrowers in the New
York market. Many of these countries have substantial U.S. assets
which, although not pledged to secure dollar debt, provide the re-
serves to service it in an emergency.
This brings me to what I think is the most important distinc-
tion between the market today and the market as it existed prior to
World War II: that is the willingness of the independent rating
agencies in New York to give bond ratings to indebtedness of foreign
issuers. This is a relatively new development, but it has become
nearly impossible for a foreign issuer to raise money in the New York
market without having first obtained a rating--at least if its plan
is to issue non-convertible debt.
of the twenty-one issuers or guarantors that have come to the
U.S. market in the last seven years, fifteen have obtained an AAA
rating from both agencies; and their borrowings have accounted for
$9.6 billion or 87.5 percent of the total amount raised. Two have
obtained an AAA from one agency and an AA from the other, accounting
for 6.2 percent. One has an AA from both agencies, accounting for
$300 million or 2.7 percent, and one has an A from both agencies but
borrowed only $20 million. Therefore, borrowers with no rating at
all accounted for only 3.4 percent or $370 million of the $10.9 bil-
lion raised since 1974.
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The overwhelming majority of business done in this market by
foreign borrowers is AAA rated. It is this quality aspect of the
borrowings that most appeals to investors here--quality, that is,
coupled with an appreciable premium in rate. A foreign sovereign
borrower, today, will probably pay as much as one hundred basis
points over the Treasury bills of a corresponding maturity; whereas
an AAA domestic industrial borrower will pay only forty additional
basis points. This differential of sixty basis points represents
the so-called "foreign premium": the amount that a foreigner must
pay in order to attract the investment interest of U.S. institutions.
The investor is therefore able to have, on the one hand, an AAA name
on his books while obtaining, on the other hand, a yield signifi-
cantly higher than that available from comparable domestic credits.
Finally, as I mentioned earlier, bond markets today are vola-
tile. Investors are sophisticated; the days when a bond was bought
and held to maturity are now long gone. An advantage of the Yankee
bond market is its liquidity. There is a significant and liquid
secondary market for Yankee bonds maintained in New York by the
principal bond dealing houses; and also, since the vast majority of
Yankee bond issues are sovereign credits, these securities are com-
pletely fungible with their equivalent issues in the Eurobond market.
There is frequent swapping between the two markets, aided by the
fact that interest on Yankee bond issues--like interest on Eurobond
issues--is paid free of all withholding tax. U.S. corporate and
government issues, on the other hand, are subject to the U.S. with-
holding tax.
3. ADVANTAGES TO THE ISSUER OF THE YANKEE BOND MARKET
A. Characteristics of the Market
Why do foreign issuers use the Yankee bond market? Issuance
of a Yankee bond provides entry into the world's largest and most
sophisticated capital market. The process of registering with the
SEC can be a painful and time consuming one. Nevertheless, once this
bridge has been crossed, entities that are substantial users of
capital then have access to the broad range of U.S. capital markets,
which can frequently provide funds in greater size or on more favor-
able terms than alternative markets.
Although the use of the commercial paper and private-place-
ment markets does not require long-term debt ratings or registration
with the SEC, the completion of these demanding processes provides
significant advantages. Continued access is gained to both the debt
and equity markets; and access to the commercial paper and private-
placement markets is made easier. Finally, the existence of favor-
able debt ratings and acceptance by U.S. capital markets can serve
only to enhance the issuer's standing in other markets.
The two principal quantitative advantages of the Yankee bond
market are cost and maturities. The Yankee bond market can frequent-
ly provide funds at a lower cost than those available elsewhere.
Although the initial costs of market entry are higher than in the
case of a Eurobond issue, interest rates are often slightly lower.
This fact, combined with the much lower U.S. commission structure,
frequently results in a lower end-cost than is obtainable in other
dollar markets. Issuers are increasingly cost sensitive. Frequent
borrowers want to choose the most competitive market; and it is
quite normal for a last minute switch to be made between the Euro-
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market and the Yankee market to take advantage of marginally lower
rates.
The second attraction of the U.S. market to foreign borrowers
is the availability of long term maturities. Of the 114 issues made
since 1974, forty-eight have been for ten years or longer, accounting
for $4.4 billion or forty percent of the total. The remainder have
been for five, seven, or eight years. Under normal market circum-
stances the U.S. can provide longer maturities than have usually
been available in other markets. Issues with maturities of twenty
or even twenty-five years have been successfully offered in the U.S.
while fifteen-year issues are considered about the longest maturities
obtainable in the Eurobond market.
The main disadvantage of the Yankee bond market is the time,
effort, and cost of registering with the SEC. However--as I will
discuss in greater detail--these costs are far less for a sovereign
issuer. This explains why the great majority of Yankee bond issues
have been made by sovereign governments or supranational agencies.
B. Characteristics of the Issues
It is worthwhile pausing for a moment to look at the princi-
pal characteristics of Yankee bond issues. First, amounts. Amounts
have varied from $20 to $200 million per tranche and up to $350 mil-
lion per issue (an issue may sometimes consist of two or more
tranches of differing maturities). The size of straight Yankee bond
issues has been increasing over the past five years. Convertible
issues have also ranged in size from $20 million to $100 million.
Since issues of less than $75 million do not develop significant
secondary market activity, we do not generally recommend offerings of
less than that amount.
Yankee bond maturities, as I have already said, range from
five to twenty-five years, but it is interesting to note that the
two issues for twenty-five years have been for corporations. We
have observed that, all other things being equal, American investors
will usually prefer a corporate credit as opposed to a government
credit of similar rank, particularly when the corporation has sig-
nificant assets located within the U.S.
One of the reasons why the volume of Yankee bond issues has
been declining is that the prevalance of inflation in the U.S. domes-
tic markets has caused investors to seek to shorten the maturity of
their exposures. As the overall average life of our domestic bonds
goes down, so does the average life of Yankee bonds. The critical
comparison between the medium-term Eurobond market and the increas-
ingly medium-term Yankee bond market becomes, therefore, interest
costs.
Most Yankee bond issues with maturities of fifteen years or
more have typically had sinking funds which have reduced their aver-
age lives to around ten years (in the case of fifteen year bonds) or
thirteen years (in the case of twenty year bonds). Convertible
issues in the Yankee bond market have also had sinking funds, re-
ducing the weighted average life of a fifteen year bond to approxi-
mately eight years. Yankee bonds have typically had call protection
providing that the bonds will not be callable for a number of years,
with the non-call period being as much as twelve years in the case
of twenty year bonds. Convertible issues, on the other hand, are
typically callable at any time.
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Underwriting discounts and commissions (customarily known as
the gross spread) are substantially less for straight debt issues
in the Yankee bond market than they are in the Eurobond market.
Gross spreads for fifteen to twenty-five year bonds are generally
about one and one-quarter percent, and for five to ten year bonds
they range from just under seven-eighths to one percent. The gross
spread on convertible issues is typically two and one-half percent,
about the same as in Europe.
The initial costs of structuring a Yankee bond issue can be
quite high. This is particularly true for corporate issuers, since
one of the major expenses is the fees for auditors who have to pre-
pare the company's financial statements in a manner acceptable to
the SEC. A first time corporate issuer undertaking an equity related
offering could find its expenses running close to $1 million. Major
items in this expense list would include, for example, about $150,000
for document printing, another $50,000 for printing and engraving secu-
rities, anywhere from $200,000 to $300,000 in accountants' fees, pro-
bably around half that amount in legal fees, $100,000 in reimburse-
ment of the underwriters' expenses, and other miscellaneous fees in-
cluding the SEC registration fee, listing fees, blue sky fees, fees
of the trustee and paying agent, and fees of the rating agencies.
C. Characteristics of the Investors
W'ho are the investors in Yankee bonds? The major purchasers
of straight Yankee bonds are U.S. institutions. However, the insti-
tutional market for Yankee bonds is quite significantly reduced in
size by the fact that two key classes of investors are limited in
their ability to purchase foreign bonds. Many public pension funds
can buy no foreign securities at all. Insurance companies, which
could be very substantial purchasers of such securities, are also
limited in the amount of overseas investments they can make. This
means that performance-oriented bank trust departments and invest-
ment advisors are critical to the success of new Yankee bond issues.
This factor makes the job of the issuer and the manager in correctly
fixing the terms of the issue much more difficult.
if a foreign company has significant operations in the U.S.,
it may be possible to structure the issue in the form of a domestic
offering with a guarantee by the foreign parent. This technique
substantially enlarges the potential universe of investors.
For obvious reasons, investment bankers are quite reluctant
to reveal precisely where they sell each respective Yankee bond is-
sue or any other bond issue. However, looking at our own retail
sales over the last four years, we can see a distinct pattern of
distribution emerging. Our own sales account for approximately seven
percent of the total amount of Yankee bond issues made during the
period under discussion. They are therefore probably a quite accu-
rate reflection of the whole.
Close to eighty percent of our sales have been made domesti-
cally; the remaining twenty percent have gone to investors located
outside the U.S. The breakdown of our domestic sales is approximate-
ly as follows: twenty percent to commercial bank trust departments,
five percent to thrift institutions, ten percent to investment funds
and investment advisors, six percent to charitable institutions,
fourteen percent to insurance companies, twelve percent to pension
funds, and thirteen percent to others, including individuals. The
proportion of these issues placed within the U.S. will obviously
vary according to maturity. For a twenty-year issue the domestically
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placed proportion is considerably higher.
I have mentioned that one of the attractions of the Yankee
bond market to borrowers is the possibility of obtaining funds at a
somewhat lower cost than might be available in the Eurobond market.
If this is true, the converse is also true: investors should be able
to obtain a better yield on their money by putting it in Eurobonds.
One reason for not putting all one's assets in the higher yielding
securities is the desire to develop a reasonable spread of risk be-
tween the Yankee and Eurobond markets. In the event that there is a
run against the dollar in Europe, the sale of unregistered Eurobonds
to European investors may become extremely difficult. On the other
hand, it is recognized that there will always exist within the U.S.
a reasonably viable market at some price for dollar denominated
securities that have been registered with the SEC.
Investors in convertible Yankee bonds typically include a
larger number of individuals than would be the case for a non-con-
vertible issue. However, the major portion of the investor group
is still institutional, albeit that the previously mentioned restric-
tions on purchases of foreign securities by pension funds and insur-
ance companies are applicable.
4. REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
As I have mentioned several times during the course of my
remarks, a major problem that foreign issuers face in the U.S. is
in meeting the registration requirements of the SEC. As most of you
know, the registration process in general has been considerably sim-
plified over the past several years. A company of stature that has
its securities broadly distributed in public hands will generally be
what is known as a reporting company, which is a company required to
file periodic reports with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Such a company, if it meets certain size and
other standards, will be able to issue debt securities by register-
ing those securities on Form S-16. This is a short-form registration
statement, and most of the information contained in it is incorporat-
ed by reference from other documents on file with the SEC. For for-
eign issuers, however, there is presently no alternative to the basic
Form S-1 registration statement, which is a considerably longer and
more burdensome document than the S-16.
A. Governmental Issuers
A governmental issuer is entitled to file an S-1 registration
statement under what is known as schedule B, which gives the govern-
mental issuer considerable leeway in the extent of its disclosure.
For governments, therefore, the SEC problem is not actually the
amount of required disclosure. Most of the statistical data that is
contained in a governmental S-1 is reasonably available within the
various economic and finance ministries. The task is really one of
collecting the data and presenting it in a format that satisfies the
SEC. Once prepared, however, subsequent registration statements for
a sovereign issuer can be prepared with relatively little trouble.
The principal problem that governmental issuers encounter with
respect to SEC registration requirements is the lack of flexibility
as to timing. A registration statement must be prepared, filed with
the SEC, and cleared before any sales of securities can take place.
This may take days or weeks in a market that can move significantly
in hours. In the Eurobond market, on the other hand, an issue can
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take place in an extremely short time, often on the basis of only a
simple offering telex.
Recently the SEC has moved to remedy this problem by means of
a so-called shelf registration. A governmental issuer may file this
at the beginning of a year and then make an offering by amending the
registration statement to reflect, in general, any material develop-
ments, underwriting arrangements, and offering terms [l].
B. Corporate Issuers
The real SEC problem concerns corporate issuers who, in add-
tion to filing the S-1 registration statement, will thereafter be
required to file reports annually on Form 20-F, which is the foreign
equivalent of a domestic issuer's Form 10-K. Despite the fact that
the SEC has adopted a quite reasonable and flexible attitude toward
the requirements of Forms S-1 and 20-F for foreign registrants,
these requirements still present the most severe hurdle: one that
keeps many prospective issuers out of our markets.
C. Problems
(i) Accounting
There are several key SEC reporting requirements that create
problems for foreign issuers. First is the sheer magnitude and cost
of the accounting requirements. This is especially true for compa-
nies located in countries whose accounting system differ quite radi-
cally from ours, particularly with regard to consolidation.
In those countries where both auditing standards and account-
ing practices are generally similar to our own--such as, for example,
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands--the SEC will normally per-
mit the inclusion of the company's existing financial statements
followed by a schedule which reconciles in reasonable detail the
financial statements presented with those which would have been re-
quired under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. In
practice, this relatively simple procedure can be extremely costly
and time consuming. For a company whose existing accounts come no-
where near our own practices, the cost of meeting U.S. auditing
standards can be enormous.
(ii) Segment accounting
Another area of dispute is segment accounting. Most U.S.
issuers now report on a segment basis with very little difficulty;
the outcome, so far as we can tell, has not caused anyone to suffer
unduly. However, for a foreign issuer, which may have five or six
domestic competitors that do not report on such a basis, the compe-
titive burden of segment reporting can be quite considerable. In
addition, we have found several cases of large foreign multinational
companies where the requirements of segment reporting have meant a
total reordering of their internal data processing systems in order
to generate the required information in a timely manner. This,
again, is something that represents a continuous burden which can be
quite costly and which makes issuers think twice before committing
themselves to meeting SEC requirements.
(iii) Executive compensation
One disclosure requirement that is totally accpeted domesti-
cally probably raises more questions in the minds of prospective
foreign issuers than almost any other. That is the disclosure of
executive compensation. As you know, a domestic registration state-
ment requires disclosure of the names of and all remuneration paid
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to the five most highly compensated directors or executive officers
whose remuneration exceeds $50,000, as well as the total number of
and remuneration to all officers as a group.
In most foreign countries, disclosure of this type is not re-
quired, and it is understandable that foreigners are extremely sen-
sitive about this matter. The chairman of a major German or French
company would find it both politically embarrassing and possibly--
given today's environment--even personally dangerous to have his
compensation disclosed in a public document. The SEC has recognized
this concern and has shown a very flexible and pragmatic attitude.
It has not objected to the disclosure of aggregate executive compen-
sation, without revealing what individuals are paid, unless more
detailed information is made public by the registrant in its own
country. Nevertheless, we find prospective issuers are still con-
cerned on this account. Once securities are outstanding in this
country, they are subject to continuing reporting requirements; and
there is concern that what is acceptable now may become more onerous
in the future. You may recall that when Form 20-F was first propos-
ed, its requirements were intended to be more consistent with those
of Form 10-K than they now are. One proposed requirement, which was
shelved after considerable opposition here and abroad, would have
resulted in more detailed compensation disclosure.
(iv) Disclosure of foreign payments
One final problem which foreign issuers have with SEC disclo-
sure requirements concerns foreign payments. Corrupt foreign pay-
ments which are material either in amount or as an indication of
management integrity must be disclosed. However, what is considered
to be a corrupt practice in the U.S. may be a normal method of doing
business in a foreign country. Indeed, there are many countries that
consider the payment of agents' fees or other similar transfers (which
we might consider to be improper and therefore disclosable in a regis-
tration statement or other SEC report form) to be a part of the normal
way of doing business and encourage them as a form of export promotion.
There have been cases where the disclosures required under our
securities laws have attracted a considerable degree of unfavorable
publicity in the company's domestic country--not because the company
did something and was caught at it, but because it was the only com-
pany operating out of that country required to make a disclosure of
that kind. The possibility of disclosure of agents' fees and other
similar payments is something that worries an issuer not only at the
time of registration but also in connection with its continuing re-
porting requirements.
(v) Proposals for change
The SEC, as part of its continuing monitoring of the reporting
requirements, has recently circulated a draft proposal requesting com-
ments on the concept of permitting foreign registrants who have secu-
rities outstanding in the U.S. market and are already using Form 20-F
to report on a regular basis to file for subsequent issues using a
much shorter form [2]. One possible system which could be adopted
would be very similar to S-16, incorporating by reference information
already filed on 20-F. We believe that this could represent a major
step forward for foreign issuers and, if adopted, would open up our
market. It would not produce an avalanche of new issues, but at
least it would make our market more acceptable to those who, while
prepared to accept the need to register once under S-1, are reluctant
to do so if they have to repeat the same process over and over again
for future issues. I urge those of you who have an interest in the
future internationalization of our securities markets to write to
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the SEC supporting the kind of liberalization contemplated in this
draft.
5. YANKEE EQUITIES
A. Characteristics of the M~arket
I would like to examine for a moment what we refer to as the
Yankee equity: the issuance here of ordinary shares by foreign com-
panies, as opposed to convertible debt or straight debt. Despite the
fact that the costs of entering this market are probably higher for
Japanese companies than for almost any other type of company--due
principally to the substantial expenditure on auditors' fees--Japan-
ese companies have accounted for by far the largest portion, in
terms of numbers, of foreign equity issuers here. Over the last
seven years there have been share issues by Kyoto Ceramics, Pioneer
Electronics, Honda Motors, Waco, Mekita Electric, Kubota and Trio
Kenwood.
The only other country that has provided equity issuers here
is the United Kingdom with British Petroleum and Tricentrol, both
companies engaged in the oil business. The largest issue was that
made by British Petroleum in June 1977, when the Bank of England
disposed of part of its holdings in that company. The issue amount-
ed to $215 million--substantially more than any other foreign equity
issue in this market, before or since. The size of other issues has
tended to be in the $20-30 million range, although Tricentrol, which
was the next largestand which I will discuss further in a minute,
amounted to $56 million.
Investors in equity issues, as demonstrated by our own retail
sales, are very largely the trust departments of commercial banks,
accounting for over one quarter of our sales. Investment funds and
investment advisors and insurance companies represent the next larg-
est group, followed closely by pension funds. Individuals account
for a relatively small proportion of the sales, and sales to over-
seas investors represent a somewhat larger proportion than is true
in the case of straight Yankee bonds.
We find that investors in foreign equity securities are knowl-
edgeable and are making these investments for a number of reasons:
(1) obviously, diversification of assets; (2) the opportunity to buy
into a market, particularly the Japanese market, which appears to be
growing somewhat faster than our own; (3) a diversification of cur-
rency risk; (4) at times, the opportunity to buy the growth segment
of a particular industry.
For example, Matsushita may today represent the best way of
penetrating the healthiest segment of the home entertainment busi-
ness. At the time of its offering here in 1977, British Petroleum
attracted considerable investment interest, since it was then the
major international oil company that had the least Arab exposure, its
reserves being heavily engaged in both the North Sea and the North
Slope.
Yankee equities are typically offered in the form of American
Depository Receipts, or ADRs. These receipts evidence ownership of
foreign securities, are designed to facilitate the transfer of owner-
ship, and are usually administered by major international banks
operating in New York under a depository agreement. They may rep-
resent stock on a share-for-share basis. However, where the value of
the underlying stock would make the value of one ADR lower than the
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most commonly traded unit values (i.e., between $10 and $30), the
ADR may represent a multiple of underlying shares: for example,
around ten in the case of Japanese corporations.
The depository agreement is entered into by the issuer and
the depository. It empowers the latter to issue receipts and to
transfer ownership of the ADRs on its own books and records, while
it continues as the official holder of record of the underlying
stock on the issuer's books. The ADRs are exchangeable into the
respective underlying stock; ADR holders enjoy the same rights,
duties, and privileges as holders of stock of the issuer. The ADRs
must also be registered under the Securities Act, but if the under-
lying stock has been registered, registration of the ADR is relative-
ly uncomplicated.
B. Tricentrol: A Case History
I shall relate to you, briefly, a case history of the sale in
this market of shares of an important foreign company, tracing it
from the moment this company first thought of entering the U.S. mar-
ket until the time the marketing was successfully completed.
On July 2, 1980, Goldman Sachs was sole U.S. manager on a
three million ADR offering for Tricentrol Ltd. with a total value of
$55.5 million. Of those three million ADRs, 2.25 million were sold
in the U.S. and 750,000 in Canada. This was the first primary offer-
ing by a British company--or, indeed, any European company--in the
U.S. equity market and only the second equity offering by a European
company since the removal of the interest equalization tax. Subse-
quent to the offering, the ADRs were listed on the New York and
Toronto Stock Exchanges.
Goldman Sachs had been advising Tricentrol for a period of
two years prior to the offering. Initial discussions with the com-
pany had centered on their need--as they perceived it--as an oil and
gas company to increase their representation in the U.S., from both
a business point of view and a financial point of view, given that
the U.S. represented the world's largest capital market with partic-
ular sophistication in financing oil and gas companies.
Early discussions with the company had focused on ways to
help them develop their business base in the U.S., either through
acquisition of companies or through the financing of acquisitions of
U.S. reserves to be developed by Tricentrol. Tricentrol viewed the
energy business as a multinational one where it is important to have
a significant stake in the U.S.; for the U.S. operates as a relative-
ly free market economy in a business where governments increasingly
tend to dominate and control the development of natural energy re-
sources.
After looking at various alternatives, the decision was made
to forgo trying to achieve both a U.S. shareholder base and an ex-
panded business base in the U.S. in one step through an exchange of
stock. It seemed more prudent to achieve the shareholder base first.
Then this shareholder base could be used for further acquisitions.
For Tricentrol's stock to be acceptable as an acquisition
currency to a U.S. company, it seemed that a registration with the
SEC and, preferably, a listing on the New York Stock Exchange after
a public offering of stock in the U.S. would be by far the most ef-
fective means of achieving this objective. In addition, the funds
raised through the offering would be available for additional U.S.
acquisition purposes. Tricentrol also decided to take the opportu-
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nity to register the stock in Canada and to have a simultaneous of-
fering in the Canadian market. This offering represents a unique
situation in that stock was simultaneously offered in the U.S. and
in Canada as an initial public offering in both markets. The pros-
pectus and registration documents met the requirements of the secu-
rities laws not only of the U.S. and Canada, but also of the United
Kingdom, where the prospectus was also registered.
Once a strategic decision had been made to do a registered
offering in the U.S. the process of achieving that registration was
both lengthy and complex. The meeting to start work on this process
took place in early February and the offering was completed in July:
a period of five months. Requirements of the SEC are particularly
complex in the case of an oil and gas company, and extensive work
was performed by the company's accountants, both internal and exter-
nal. Added complications were caused by the need to have a firm of
independent geologists estimate the reserves of the company in both
North America and the North Sea. Furthermore, during the period
they were working on the transaction, Tricentrol made an acquisition
in the United Kingdom which was so significant that the target com-
pany's financial statements had to be included in the registration
statement.
As a result of these complications the prospectus contains
seventy pages of text and sixty-two pages of financial statements
for a total of 132 pages. In addition to the prospectus, almost
3,000 pages of additional material had to be filed with the SEC, some
of which involved confidential contracts between Tricentrol and the
British government about the development of their North Sea fields.
The British government required Tricentrol to negotiate with the SEC
to obtain confidential treatment for these documents. As mentioned
earlier, the offering was also to be registered in Canada. This
called for additional disclosure required by the Canadian Securities
Law. Finally, the whole prospectus had to be translated into French
in order to meet the requirements of the Quebec Securities Law and
thus to be eligible for offering in that province.
In addition to the difficulty of preparing documentation to
conform to both U.S. and Canadian requirements, the marketing effort
posed similar problems. There are significant differences in the
procedures used in the Canadian new-issue distribution process from
those that are normal in the U.S. Much time was spent by Goldman
Sachs (lead manager of this offering) coordinating with Wood Gundy
(the Canadian manager) to ensure that the two different distribution
processes were indeed coordinated, so that an offering could be com-
pleted on the same day and effectively at the same price.
The Canadian investors were offered shares in Canadian dollars
based on a translation of the U.S. dollar offering price. The com-
pany and the investors were protected against movements in the for-
eign exchange market between the time of pricing and the time of
payment. The underwriters took out, on behalf of the company, a
forward foreign-exchange contract. This covered the difference be-
tween the price in Canadian dollars that Canadian investors were to
pay for their shares and the price in U.S. dollars that the company
was to receive at the time of the closing. Additional discussions
took place, particularly with the New York Stock Exchange and the
blue sky authorities in the various states in the U.S., for it seems
it is common practice in the U.K. for companies to make loans to
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Clearly, this offering by Tricentrol represented a substan-
tial investment in money and in management time. Nevertheless, sub-
stantial benefit resulted from the offering, both in terms of the
offering itself and in terms of the company's positioning itself for
the future. This is particularly notable because Tricentrol is not
the sort of company you would expect to be using the U.S. capital
market. It is not in the top tier of international British compa-
nies. It is relatively small; and up to this point, it has relied
primarily on the U.K. market as a source of capital. At the time
of the offering, the company had a total market capitalization of
approximately $460 million; and the offering represented more than
eleven percent of the number of shares then outstanding. Neverthe-
less, as this offering indicates, it may turn out that it is the
second-tier foreign companies which can obtain the greatest benefit
from an equity offering in the U.S.
In Tricentrol's case, some of these benefits are as follows:
(1) An offering of $55.5 million represents a substantial new source
of equity capital and reduces the risk that the London market, which
had provided equity to the company as recently as 1979, might be
unable to meet the company's quite substantial needs.
(2) An offering in the U.S. represents the first step in a program
to obtain access to all aspects of the U.S. capital market. The
U.S. market is the largest in the world and can be expected to pro-
vide additional sources of funds at all times. Reliance on the
political and economic status of a single smaller economy is avoided,
and registration with the SEC acclimates Tricentrol to the U.S. dis-
closure requirements in a way that should allow it to meet subse-
quent obligations relatively easily.
(3) Tricentrol is now in a position to use its stock in connection
with the acquisition of a U.S. company. With a New York Stock Ex-
change listing and a successful U.S. offering behind it, Tricentrol
will have a market acceptance with shareholders of potential target
companies, which it would not have had without such an offering.
(4) Tricentrol's business strategy calls for increased exposure in
the U.S. The publicity associated with the offering and the pre-
sentation of Tricentrol in a format familiar to the U.S. business
community will facilitate that exposure. It will increase knowledge
of Tricentrol among U.S. companies in the oil industry.
(5) In addition to providing sources of funds, the U.S. capital mar-
ket will be a source of support to Tricentrol in the future. Up to
the time of the offering, the company was dependent upon the U.K.
equity market--a market that is relatively unsophisticated in evalu-
ating oil and gas companies, particularly those whose assets are
located outside the U.K. continental shelf. It is to be expected
that at various times in the future U.S. investors will value Tri-
centrol's assets and earnings more highly than will the U.K. market.
This will provide buying support for the stock and thereby facili-
tate additional equity financing or acquisition through the use of
common shares.
6. OTHER MARKETS
In conclusion, I shall touch briefly on two other major capi-
tal markets that are of importance to foreign issuers. The first is
our commercial paper market. This is a market that really does not
exist anywhere else in the world.
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A. Commercial Paper
Commercial paper is unsecured short-term promissory notes,
typically used by well-capitalized industrial, commercial, public
utility, finance, and bank holding companies. It is sold in the
open market, usually on a discounted basis.
Commercial paper has provided a means of short-term financing
for over a century and a half, but it has experienced its most rapid
growth in recent years. The total value of commercial paper out-
standing in the market place has risen from $260 million in the
period just after World War II to approximately $125 billion today.
At the present time, approximately one thousand major corporations
maintain commercial paper ratings from one or more of the three rat-
ing agencies. While not all the rated companies are active in the
market at the same time, a substantial majority have occasion to
come to the market at some time during any given year.
The market is divided into two segments. The first--compris-
ing just over half of the total amount outstanding--is made up of
issuers selling their paper directly to investors. These are mainly
finance companies, such as GMAC, Ford Motor Credit, and G.E. Credit.
The other segment represents issuers whose paper is marketed by a
dealer.
Foreign borrowers like the U.S. commercial paper market for
a number of reasons. First, it offers a source of funds that has
historically been cheaper than alternative borrowing sources such as
the London interbank market and the U.S. domestic commercial bank
market. Second, it provides a diversification in a company's or a
bank's source of dollar funds. Third, it is a flexible instrument
in terms of tailoring maturities to the borrower's needs, since
paper can be issued in maturities of anything from 5 to 270 days.
Last, the issuance of commercial paper is an attractive and relative-
ly easy-to-manage method of gaining access to the U.S. capital mar-
kets. Commercial paper is exempt from registration under the Secu-
rities Acts. On the other hand, commercial paper does require the
issuance of a rating. The highest commercial paper rating generally
indicates that the borrower would have a bond rating of at least an
AA or possibly a very strong A. Obtaining a commercial paper rating
paves the way for ultimately obtaining a long term bond rating. The
institutional buyers of commercial paper parallel in many respects
those who will ultimately buy a long-term debt issue.
As of the end of last year, approximately eighty-two foreign
corporations, government agencies, and banks were using the U.S.
commercial paper market. The average reported quarterly value of
outstanding commercial paper of these issuers totalled just under
$10 billion. The issuers included entities located in Australia,
the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, New Zealand, Japan, Belgium,
Finland, Sweden, Germany, Holland, and Denmark. There were major
programs by such issuers as British Petroleum, which had close to $1
billion outstanding; Electricite de France, with $1.7 billion; Caisse
Nationale de T616communication, the French telephone company with
$500 million; and the state-owned British Gas Corporation and Bri-
tish National Oil Co., each with just under $250 million.
A recent development in the commercial paper market has been
the growing interest of foreign banks in tapping this market. These
banks see commercial paper as a method of diversifying their dollar
funding, of tapping a broad segment of investors in the U.S., and
of obtaining funds at a lower cost than in the European interbank
market. Banks such as Barclay's, BNP, Swiss Bank Corp., Union Bank
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of Switzerland, Cr~dit Lyonnais, and Amsterdam-Roterdam Bank have
chosen to adopt this method of financing within the last year or so.
Our experience as the leading commercial paper dealer in the U.S.
leads us to believe that this method will continue to prove attrac-
tive to top-rated foreign borrowers. From the investors' point of
view, it represents a convenient and easy method of getting better
acquainted with these major companies located outside the U.S.
B. Private-Placement Market
The other market I want to touch on briefly is our domestic
private-placement market. This, again, is somewhat unique. Until
recently there was really no other place in the world where major
borrowers could negotiate directly with lenders and obtain large
sums of long-term money on a totally private basis without any after-
market listing or broad distribution. This private-placement market
has not proved to be a very significant source of funds for truly
foreign borrowers, since in many cases--as I described in greater
detail earlier--the lenders were precluded from lending more than
a small proportion of their assets to such borrowers. I strongly
believe there is a case to be made for liberalizing these con-
straints and I am pleased to note that this is already happening in
the case of investments in Mexico.
Where the foreign borrower has substantial assets in the U.S.,
however, his U.S. operations can be treated as a domestic entity for
the purpose of meeting the various state legality tests. Through
the medium of a guarantee or some other method of support, the par-
ent ensures that the U.S. affiliate has the best possible credit
rating and can obtain funds on the most attractive terms. The
private-placement market has therefore been popular with foreign
companies that are making acquisitions here or are expanding their
assets base within the U.S.
The U.S. private-placement market is also a major source of
funds for complex projects. Project financing typically relies for
credit support on contracts between the project, users of output,
suppliers of raw materials, and other sponsors. By fitting together
the various components, a viable credit can be created, but one
which is complex and therefore difficult to sell in public markets.
Accordingly, most project financing in the U.S. is undertaken on a
private-placement basis. In addition, where project equipment is
to be leased, the U.S. tax laws provide substantial advantages to
domestic owners of equipment that may be located in a foreign coun-
try. The lessor is still permitted to obtain accelerated deprecia-
tion and certain other fiscal advantages, but probably not invest-
ment-tax credit. Because of this, sponsors of major projects around
the world tend to look toward the U.S. private-placement market if
there is any possibility of obtaining funds here on a long-term basis.
Typically, the main constraint is sovereign risk when the
project is located in a developing country. However, projects in
Australia, New Zealand, the North Sea, Canada, and, more recently,
Mexico, have found advantageous financing by using our private-
placement market. Goldman Sachs has been responsible, for example,
for financing drilling rigs constructed for Pemex to use in offshore
oil exploration and development by the Mexican state oil company.
These rigs are owned by U.S. lessors. They are leased to Pemex un-
der long term leases, with the related financing being placed with
U.S. institutions. Pemex has obtained U.S. financing for substantial
capital expenditures by this route.
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In summary, I believe the U.S. capital market represents a
sophisticated and vital component of the world capital markets.
We hope that issuers will increasingly use the U.S. markets, par-
ticularly as regulatory constraints are gradually reduced.
MR. HAWES: Steve Friedman, would you like to make some com-
ments and raise some questions?
7. DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR FOREIGNERS
MR. FRIEDMAN: I think the SEC is clearly moving in the direc-
tion of integration in the use of shelf registrations and is in-
creasingly confronting the question of differential disclosure for
foreign issuers. But in evaluating those judgments, it is useful to
keep in mind why we are doing this. Accordingly, my first question
for Michael is, why do you think it is in the interest of the U.S.
to encourage the use of our capital markets by foreign issuers?
MR. COLES: I think that the flow of capital, like the flow
of goods and services, should be a two way street. If we create
barriers to the use of our markets by others, it is quite possible
that, when we need them most, others might create barriers to our
use of their markets.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Michael, excuse me, but disclosure requirements
are not barriers. They are inefficiencies in our market as compared
to the Eurobond markets. They impose additional costs on raising
capital in U.S. markets, but there are no discriminatory barriers
against foreigners.
For example, consider the accounting issues. Differential
accounting and auditing standards are a very serious problem, al-
though I think it is interesting that the companies for which the
accounting issue is probably the most difficult--the Japanese com-
panies--are the ones that have been willing to face up to it and pay
for access to our markets. in thinking about how far we ought to go
to accommodate other accounting systems, it is important to keep in
mind why we are doing so and why it is important to our national
interest. Why is it useful for the U.S. to have foreign companies
raising capital here?
MR. COLES: With respect to equity issues, if I may answer
that first, the question would be, are U.S. investors better served
by having an enormous amount of information about a very, very few
companies? Or, would they not be better served by having a vastly
expanded horizon of companies in which to invest, with a somewhat
reduced level of disclosure? It could be argued that it is like--if
I may use an analogy--pollution control. Getting the last five per-
cent of dirt out of the air is what costs you the most. I doubt
that general conformity to our requirements is the thing that worries
foreign issuers the most. The problem is with some of our more mar-
ginal requirements, for example, the U.S. existed happily for many,
many years without segment reporting being required to meet the dis-
closure obligations of the securities acts. Now, that is a major
problem. We have discussed the disclosure of foreign payments. A-
gain, I believe that the SEC did not necessarily feel this informa-
tion was essential for investors to know. This disclosure requirement
was used more, in our view, as an enforcement technique.
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I think we would not propose that the overall standards of
disclosure required for coming to the U.S. market should be lowered
in any significant way. U.S. investors are entitled to a level of
disclosure superior to that of the rest of the world; as I said
early in my remarks, this is the market where you play with a clean
deck. On the other hand, anything we can do to simplify disclosure,
to make it easier for companies to meet our requirements without re-
moving the basic premises on which the securities acts were built,
would be a positive step.
MR. FRIEDMAN: I find it curious that so few foreign companies
are using our market. As I listened to you talk, it became obvious
that the problem of regulatory requirements creating undue delays is
clearly a very serious one. On the other hand, the volatility of the
bond markets is a relatively recent phenomenon, and there was a peri-
od of relative interest rate stability after the IET was lifted
during which there was not much activity in our markets. You talked
about an interest rate differential and a commission differential and
I believe you concluded that the net cost of financing in this market
for an appropriate company ought to be lower, even granting the high-
er front-end costs because of regulation.
If we were able to deal with the timing problem through a
continuous disclosure system and if we dealt with some of what I
will call the irritants in the disclosure system, do you think it is
likely that there would be a substantially greater use of our markets
by foreign companies?
MR. COLES: I think that the use of our bond markets by for-
eign companies would not increase dramatically except for companies
that deem it necessary to come to the market every year. That is
one of the reasons why governmental issues predominate. You swallow
the first front-end costs, and from that point onwards that cost is
already sunk. You do subsequent issues all the time, and it becomes
relatively easy. For a corporation that is going to issue on a one-
time-only basis, the Eurobond market will always be more attractive.
MR. FRIEDMAN: In spite of the cost differential?
MR. COLES: The cost on a one-time issue, if you figure in
the front-end out-of-pocket costs, will always be higher here than
in the Eurobond market. How many European non-governmentally owned
companies come to the market for a bond issue every year? Relative-
ly few.
I believe my firm is engaged at the moment in preparing for
registration a major foreign company which sees the U.S. market as
an insurance policy. As a continuous user of dollars, the company
is concerned that somewhere down the road this may be the only game
in town for dollars, and it wants to have access to this market. It
turned out to be a very expensive insurance policy.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Problems of this nature impose an important
discipline because they make us think anew about whether some of the
disclosures that we require are really so essential. There is a use-
ful fallout effect for our domestic disclosure system. Nevertheless,
I think it is a fair question to ask whether it is worth going
through this process for foreign issuers if there are not going to
be substantial numbers of them in our markets.
MR. COLES: I think that the greatest expansion would be in
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equity securities, and this is the area that would benefit U.S. in-
vestors the most.
MR. FRIEDMAN: I agree with you.
MR. COLES: There are major companies--for example, natural
resource companies or companies with unique positions--that are not
available in U.S. markets, and it would be very useful to have such
exposure here. Again, I go back to my question, do you have a lot
of disclosure from very few, or do you lower the standards somewhat
--I would not want to see them abolished altogether--and admit many
more issuers here?
MR. HAWES: Michael, what are the weights given to the par-
ticular concerns expressed by foreign issuers, for example, account-
ing standards and the disclosure of foreign payments? To what extent
are these issuers frightened of the SEC, or are they simply frightened
that regulations will change every week or every few months?
MR. COLES: The proposal to amend 20-F, even though it was
shelved, did cause an enormous amount of concern.
MR. HAWES: The original proposal...
MR. COLES: The original proposal was to amend 20-F, to bring
it much more in line with 10-K. The reaction of many of our pros-
pective clients was, "They tried it once, they might try it again.
Once we have the securities out here, there is no way we can pull
them back. We issue a twenty year bond in the U.S., and it has ten
years of call protection; then somebody suddenly says that they want
this or this or this in the way of disclosure, and we are stuck with
it." That is still a concern.
The other question of great importance to foreign issuers is
based on the problems of preparing the first registration. Having
lived through it ourselves three times with European companies and
several times with Japanese companies, we can tell you that the
work involved is incredible. It involves bringing in new management
in some cases and new data processing systems. Our clients ask the
question: "We understand the general principle under which you are
operating; but when you get down to that last five percent which
accounts for fifty percent of the cost, is it really necessary?"
MR. FRIEDMAN: Let us assume the Commission were prepared to
do something about that. What kind of a process would one adopt to
identify that last five percent? The last five percent may vary
from company to company and management to management as their sensi-
tivities shift, and it may be difficult to deal with it in a generic
way.
MR. HAWES: What are the major segments of the five percent?
MR. COLES: Your proposal for the--I will call it the S-16--
goes along the right way because, as a U.S. company knows, it is
much easier to prepare a 10-K than it is to prepare an S-1, even
though much of the information is the same. If a company has to
report to the SEC on a regular basis, I think the ability to submit
a short-form registration statement later on will make the initial
burden much more palatable. Anything we could do to cut down the
minutiae that is required in notes to the financial statement would
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help. The length and bulk of our financial statements are incre-
dible.
Many times the question we are asked is, does anybody read it?
MR. HAWES: One possible answer to the concern of foreign
issuers about becoming a reporting company and then having the SEC
increase or drastically change the disclosure requirements would be
a kind of moratorium. The SEC could provide that it would give
foreign issuers the choice of accepting a change in disclosure re-
quirements or of continuing under the old rules for a period, say
five years, which would be adequate to allow the foreign issuer to
withdraw from the market in an orderly way (e.g., through a tender
offer program or redemption).
NOTES:
[I] See The Kingdom of Sweden release, named after the government involved.
Securities Act Release No. 6240, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,609 (1980).
[2] Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980). The
International Securities Matters Committee of the American Bar
Association wrote a letter commenting very favorably on the possi-
bility of using the concept of world-class companies to categorize
those who might be permitted to use simplified registration forms.
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